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Abstract
Emissions trading can be organized in several ways. In particu-
lar, private emissions trading can be organized as permit trading, or
as credit trading. The schemes have a diﬀerent impact on output
with credit trading leading to a higher output level than permit trad-
ing. This paper analyzes what the optimal choice of emissions trading
scheme is in a model with international trade and perfect competition
in the product and emission quota market. Furthermore, I discuss
whether it is optimal for the country to allow its ﬁrms to trade emis-
sions internationally. The paper shows that countries want to use
these schemes in diﬀerent circumstances, depending on whether they
import or export the good. Furthermore, it is shown that in several
cases, countries maximize their welfare by not allowing international
emissions trading.
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1 Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 allows international trade in greenhouse gas
emissions between the countries that committed to an emission ceiling (the
Annex B Countries). Several countries are already engaged in project based
emissions trading and are preparing for international emissions trading be-
tween private parties. The most elaborate example of the latter is the EU
wide CO2 trading scheme between several of the most energy intensive sec-
tors.
As the discussion within the EU showed, there are many issue to be settled
before an international emissions trading scheme can be implemented. One of
the most important issues is what the basis for the national emissions trading
schemes should be. Here, the choice is basically between a cap and trade
system and a system based on relative standards (Boom (2001), Gielen et
al. (2002) and Boom (2003)). In the ﬁrst system, denoted as permit trading,
there is a cap on total emissions. This cap is divided into permits that are
distributed over the emissions sources, who are then allowed to trade them.
In the second system, denoted as credit trading, ﬁrms are allowed to emit a
certain amount of emissions per unit of output. This means that the total
level of emissions is not ﬁxed, but can change with output. Firms that can
stay below the standard can sell emission credits. It is not necessary for a ﬁrm
to reduce emissions before it can issue credits. Just as with permit trading, a
ﬁrm can issue a credit if it expects to reduce emissions (see Boom and Nentjes
(2003)). The two schemes have a diﬀerent impact on the industry. Output
is higher under credit trading than under permit trading and if the total
emission goal is the same under both schemes, marginal abatement costs will
be higher under credit trading. Of these two schemes, permit trading is the
most eﬃcient and leads to the highest welfare when all emission sources are
price takers both in the goods and in the emission quota markets.
Besides the choice between credit and permit trading, governments must
decide whether or not to allow international emissions trading. The eﬀect
of opening up for international trading is that the price of emission quotas
will change, which in turn will aﬀect production within the country. If the
regulated industry is small on a world scale, this is how far the analysis goes.
A country will then always gain from allowing emissions trading since it will
either save abatement costs, or make a gain from the sale of permits. This is
the classical case for emissions trading, both nationally and internationally.
It also follows that the optimal international emissions trading scheme under
these circumstances is permit trading.
However, countries can have market power in a good, even when their
ﬁrms do not. In that case, the country can aﬀect the price on the world3
market by altering domestic production through some of the policies it sets.
As will be clear from the description of permit and credit trading above, one
such policy that potentially could aﬀect the world market is environmental
policy.
The main purpose of this paper is to analyze whether countries have an in-
centive to choose their emissions trading scheme strategically when they have
market power in the goods market. To this end, a partial equilibrium model
with one industry is developed with perfect competition in both the goods
and the emissions quota market. Although a country could have market
power in the emissions quota market too, this will be harder to obtain than
market power in a good since several industries will be trading emission quo-
tas together. To concentrate on the choice of instrument, it is assumed that
the countries involved have committed to a cap on total domestic emissions.
Several papers have discussed the eﬀect of environmental policy on interna-
tional trade and welfare, but not many papers discuss instrument choice of
a country in such a setting with perfect competition in the goods market
(see next Section for an overview of the literature). This paper diﬀers from
previous work in this area in that it compares instruments of environmental
policy in their eﬀect on the welfare of a country and in that it considers the
choice between national and international emissions trading. The analysis
shows that countries have an incentive to distort international trade through
the choice of emissions trading scheme and that in certain cases countries
have an incentive not to allow international emissions trading.
In the next section a brief overview of previous, related work, is given.
In Section 3 a partial equilibrium two stage model is presented. In the ﬁrst
stage, the government decides which form of emissions trading to implement
and whether or not to allow international emissions trading. In the second
stage, ﬁrms maximize their proﬁts under perfect competition while taking the
choice of instrument by the government as given. As is usual in stage games,
the two stages will be discussed in reverse order. The optimal instrument
choice for the country is discussed at the end of the section. A summary and
conclusions are given in Section 4
2 Literature Review
In all the models discussed in this section it is assumed that ﬁrms operate in
a market of perfect competition. One of the characteristics of such a market
is that no single ﬁrm has an inﬂuence on the price of the good produced.
However a country may be able to aﬀect the price of a good. It will be able
to do so when it produces a considerable part of total world output and when4
it implements some policy that aﬀects all domestic ﬁrms in the sector.
Markusen (1975) develops a model of trade and transboundary pollution.
In the model, there are two commodities the production of one of these is
causing pollution. There is no possibility for substitution among inputs or
outputs so as to reduce emissions, and neither is an abatement technology
available. Therefore, the only method to reduce domestic pollution is by
reducing production. Not only domestic production causes pollution, this is
also the case with foreign pollution. The market for the two commodities
is assumed to be perfect. The government seeks to maximize welfare and
has three instruments to do so; it can use a tariﬀ on exports and imports,
a production tax and a consumption subsidy. Markusen ﬁrst determines the
optimal tax structure, after which he analyzes the three cases where only one
of these instruments can be used.
The ﬁrst best tax structure consists of a production tax and a trade tax.
The production tax is set at the usual level, where marginal abatement costs
equal marginal social damage costs. The trade tax consists of two parts: a
trade part and a pollution part. The trade part is the usual optimal tariﬀ
formula for the two-good case. This part will be positive if the good is im-
ported and negative (an export tax) when the good is exported. The second
part results from foreign pollution. This part is always positive. Hence, the
domestic government tries to lower foreign pollution by imposing a tariﬀ on
the import of the foreign good.
Of the three cases where only one instrument can be used, the case with
product taxes is the most interesting for our purpose. With only a production
tax, the three components mentioned above all inﬂuence the level of the
tax. First of all, domestic pollution calls for a positive tax. However, this
production tax will cause the price to rise, which in turn encourages foreign
production and thereby foreign pollution. Hence, with foreign pollution, the
production tax will be lower than without foreign pollution. The third part
is the already mentioned optimal tariﬀ part. When the product is imported,
the good should be subsidized, when it is exported, it should be taxed. The
resulting tax (or subsidy) depends on the strengths of these three eﬀects.
Krutilla (1991) analyzes essentially the same model as Markusen. How-
ever, in the model by Krutilla, pollution is not transboundary but only do-
mestic and only one good is produced. Besides discussing pollution as a
production externality, Krutilla also models the case where pollution is a
consumption externality. Just as Markusen, Krutilla discusses the use of
both an environmental tax and a tariﬀ on the export or import of the good.
Not surprisingly Krutilla arrives at the same conclusions as Markusen in the
case of a production externality. The optimum can be reached by use of
an optimum Pigouvian tax on pollution and an optimal tariﬀ on exports or5
imports. When the tariﬀ instrument cannot be used, the environmental tax
is lower than the optimal Pigouvian tax when the good is imported, while it
is higher than the optimal Pigouvian tax when the good is exported.
Dijkstra (1998) develops a model similar to Markusen (1975) and Krutilla
(1991). However, Dijkstra makes a comparison between taxes and standards
per unit of product. Whereas in the models by Markusen and Krutilla abate-
ment technologies are not available, they are in Dijkstra (1998). Hence, in
Markusen (1975) and Krutilla (1991) emissions can only be reduced by reduc-
ing production and therefore, an emission tax is equivalent to a production
tax. In the model by Dijkstra, emissions can be reduced by reducing pro-
duction and by increasing the abatement eﬀort.
Dijkstra (1998) analyzes a model with perfect competition between ﬁrms
and explicitly includes the consumer surplus. He studies four cases: autarky,
international trade without pollution, international trade and domestic pol-
lution and international trade and global pollution. The model is a one shot
game of instrument choice between governments, where the ﬁrst two cases
are used as benchmarks. Dijkstra (1998) shows that there is no diﬀerence
between the instruments taxes, permit trading and ﬁrm emission ceilings.
However, he does ﬁnd a diﬀerence between these instruments and an emis-
sion standard per unit of product. The main reason for this is that with
a standard per unit of product the producer will produce more than with
the other instruments. Hence, in cases where welfare can be increased by
higher production, standards per product outperform taxes. Dijkstra (1998)
ﬁnds two such cases. Production is too low with emission taxes when a
country imports the polluting good. This result comes about irrespective
whether pollution is local or transboundary. A second case occurs only with
transboundary pollution. Dijkstra assumes that the foreign country does not
reduce emissions. If the domestic country reduces emissions, domestic output
becomes lower and foreign output increases. The latter eﬀect is unwanted
because foreign output is more polluting than domestic output. Therefore,
it would be better to have both low domestic emissions and high domestic
output. This can be achieved with relative standards.
The model presented in the next section builds on the models discussed
above, especially on Dijkstra (1998). The model extends previous work in
that credit trading has never been considered in this setting before. The main
contribution however is that international emissions trading, in two forms, is
added to the analysis. The setting makes it possible to analyze instrument
choice at the national and international level, and to determine whether it
always is optimal for governments to allow international emissions trading.
Diﬀerent from the models discussed above, I assume that the emission level in
all relevant countries is ﬁxed. Hence, there is no interplay between instrument6
choice and levels of emissions. This is done to concentrate on the choice of
emissions trading scheme.
3 The Model
In this section, a model is presented with perfect competition in the goods
and emission quota market. The good is traded internationally with pro-
ducers being located both in the home country and abroad. Firms have no
inﬂuence on the price of the product or emission quotas. However, it is as-
sumed that the country’s output of the product is so large compared to total
world production that the government can aﬀect the product price by the en-
vironmental policy it implements. In the model, it is assumed that countries
have no market power in the emissions quota market. The rationale for this is
that international emissions trading will occur between ﬁrms from several in-
dustries from various countries. Therefore, it is harder to gain market power
in the emissions quota market through the choice of instrument in an indus-
try that to obtain market power in the market for a good. Essentially, the
government has to make two choices: 1) which instrument of environmental
policy to choose, where we limit the analysis to permit and credit trading,
and 2) whether to restrict trading to national emission sources, or to allow
international emissions trading between sources. The model is a two stage
model with the government moving ﬁrst by choosing an instrument. In the
second stage, ﬁrms maximize proﬁts, while taking the choice of instrument
as given. As is usual with stage games, stage two is analyzed before stage
one.
There are nh producers of a homogeneous good in the domestic country,
with nh being large. Each ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁts taking the price P as
given. Costs are represented by C(q,E), where q is production and E are
emissions. We assume that Cq > 0, Cqq ≥ 0a n dCqE < 0. Furthermore,
CE = 0 without environmental policy and CE < 0 with environmental policy
and CEE ≥ 0. The government has set a limit on total emissions from the
industry equal to Lh. In the following, it is assumed that the government has
perfect information about the behavior of the ﬁrms. It is therefore always
able to set the environmental policy such that the total limit on emissions is
realized.
3.1 Stage Two: Firm behavior
In this section we analyze ﬁrm behavior. First, we deal with the case when the
government implements national policies, but does not allow international7
emissions trading between private entities. Here we restrict the choice of
national instrument to permit trading and credit trading. Permit trading
is based on an absolute cap on emissions, while credit trading is based on
relative standards that put a limit on emissions per unit of output. As
Dijkstra (1999) shows, the outcome under permit trading is identical to that
under taxes or absolute standards. Furthermore, the outcome under credit
trading is identical to the outcome under relative standards. So, although the
analysis is limited to only two instruments, results apply to other instruments
as well. In the following we will show that credit trading leads to a higher
output level and higher marginal abatement costs than permit trading.
Permit Trading. With permit trading, the ceiling that is placed on total
domestic emissions is divided over the ﬁrms in the form of emission permits
that give the right to emit a certain amount of the pollutant. The initial
distribution of permits can either be for free grandfathering) or through an
auction, or a combination of the two. After the initial distribution, ﬁrms are
free to trade the permits. Here, we assume that the permits are grandfa-
thered. With permit trading, the ﬁrm’s maximization problem becomes
max
q Π=Pq− C(q,E) − t(E − ¯ E)( 1 )
Here t is the domestic permit price and ¯ E is the initial allocation of permits,
with ¯ e = Lh/nh. The ﬁrst order conditions are
P = Cq (2)
−CE = t
These are the usual conditions under perfect competition; the ﬁrm equates
marginal costs of production to the price of the product and also equates the
marginal costs of emissions to the price of permits.
Credit Trading. With credit trading, the government sets an emission
ceiling ¯ e per unit of production, with ¯ e = Lh/nhqh. Firms are than allowed
to sell credits if they (think they) can stay stay below the standard. The
maximization problem of the ﬁrm becomes
max
q Π=Pq− C(q,E) − t(E − ¯ eq)( 3 )
where rt is the price of credits. The ﬁrst order conditions are
P + t¯ e = Cq8
−CE = t
Combining the two ﬁrst order conditions gives
P = Cq +¯ eCE (4)
Comparing equation (4) with equation (2), it is clear that production will
be higher with relative targets than with permit trading at the same level
of emissions. To see this, recall that CE < 0a n d¯ e>0. Hence, the factor
¯ eCE is negative. The result is that the product price is lower under relative
standards than under permit trading. This can only be the case when pro-
duction is higher under relative standards than under permit trading. The
reason for this diﬀerence is that with credit trading the ﬁrm is allowed to
emit more as it produces more.
Another result should also be noted. With relative standards, the marginal
costs of abatement will be higher than under permit trading. This result
follows from the fact that total emissions are equal under the two instru-
ments, while output is higher under relative standards. As mentioned above,
the marginal abatement costs is increasing in output for the same level of
pollution. Hence, marginal costs of abatement will be higher with relative
standards than with permit trading.
International Emissions Trading. As mentioned above, we assume that
neither ﬁrms nor governments have market power in the market for emission
quotas. This means that the international emission quota price is given for
ﬁrms. Denote the international quota price by T. The only change in the
analysis for the two instruments then is that t is replaced by T.
3.2 Stage One: Choice of Emissions Trading Scheme
We now turn to the instrument choice of a country. The case analyzed is the
one where all relevant countries have committed to a certain emission goal.
The emission goal of the home country is given by Lh. The assumption that
all relevant countries have committed to an emission ceiling makes that the
emission levels are ﬁxed, and hence, that countries do not have an incentive
to manipulate the level of emissions.
Since now we turn to the level of the country and not the ﬁrm or industry,
we have to adapt the notation slightly. In the following, qh denotes the total
production of the domestic industry. The home country is large enough to
inﬂuence the price of the product. This also implies that a change in domestic
production leads to a change in foreign production. Total foreign production
is denoted as Qf(P(y),I f), where If is the foreign policy choice. It must9
hold that −1 <∂ Q f/∂nhqh < 0, i.e., when the output of the home country
increases, foreign producers reduce their output, but not by as much as the
original increase increase of output by the home country. The overall result is
that total output is increased but by less than the initial increase in output.
All consumers in all countries are assumed to be identical. In the following,
we denote by µh the proportion of identical consumers in the home country.
3.2.1 No international emissions trading
We ﬁrst analyze the case where international emissions trading is not possible,
neither between ﬁrms nor between governments. The welfare of the domestic
country is given by
max
qh
W = µh
 y
o
P(y)dy − P(y)µhy + P(y)nhqh − nhC(qh,E h)( 5 )
The ﬁrst two terms on the RHS of equation (5) give the domestic consumers’
surplus. The last two terms give the producers’ surplus. Diﬀerentiating
equation (5) with respect to qh gives
∂W
∂qh
= nh (P − Cqh)+P
 ∂y
∂qh
(nhqh − µhy)=0 ( 6 )
The ﬁrst term gives the aggregate diﬀerence between product price and
marginal production costs, while the second term gives the trade balance
in the product times the market power of the country. As already mentioned
in section 2, the optimal policy would normally consist of an import subsidy
or export tax combined with an emission tax or permit trading. However, in
this paper it is assumed that the government cannot use an import subsidy
or export tax. Therefore, it can only aﬀect domestic welfare through the
choice of environmental policy instrument.
In one special case it is possible for the government to obtain maximum
welfare. This will happen when the implementation of permit trading leads
to autarky. This can be seen by setting the term for the domestic excess
supply, nhqh − µhy, equal to zero. The result is equivalent to equation (2),
which gives the optimal level of production in the case of permit trading.
Suppose that permit trading does not lead to autarky in the product,
but to a net export of the product. We now ﬁnd P = Cqh and nhqh >µ hy.
Equation (6) now becomes negative and welfare would be higher with a
lower level of production. However, production should not be so low that
the country achieves autarky. With autarky, P>C qh and nhqh = µhy and
welfare would be higher with a higher production level. This shows that10
when permit trading leads to net exports of the product, optimal welfare
is reached with a lower production level, but the country should still be an
exporter. The reason for this result is that when the country is an exporter,
the producers’ surplus is more important for the welfare of the country than
the consumers’ surplus. By reducing output, the country can increase the
price of the product, increasing proﬁts for its own ﬁrms. When the country
is a net importer of the good, the consumers’ surplus is more important than
the producers’ surplus so that the country will want to increase production
to reduce the price of the product. In the case where permit trading leads to
a net export of the good, permit trading is not optimal since output is too
large. However, the only alternative is credit trading, which leads to even
higher output. Therefore, permit trading is the best choice under the given
circumstances.
We now turn to the case where the imposition of permit trading leads to
an import deﬁcit. Then, qh <µ hy and P = Cqh. Now production is lower
than optimal. Hence, the government would want to increase production.
This can be done by the imposition of relative standards. In that case P<
Cqh. However, the imposition of relative standards may increase production
by so much that the import deﬁcit turns into a balanced trade balance or
even into an export surplus. In those cases relative standards are not optimal.
Hence, the country will only prefer credit trading when it is a large importer
of the good.
The result is that permit trading are the optimal instrument when they
lead to an export surplus or a small import deﬁcit. When these instruments
lead to a large import deﬁcit, the government prefers to use relative stan-
dards.
3.2.2 International emissions trading.
We now turn to the situation where ﬁrms are allowed to trade emission quotas
internationally. As mentioned before, we assume that neither the ﬁrms, nor
the country have market power in the market for emission quotas. Welfare
of a country consists of the consumers’ surplus and the producers’ surplus.
Before we turn to the analysis of the home country’s welfare, we ﬁrst discuss
the eﬀect of a shift to international emissions trading on the proﬁts of a ﬁrm.
Since the proﬁt function diﬀers for the two trading schemes, we will discuss
them in turn, starting with permit trading.
What happens to production as ﬁrms are allowed to trade emission per-
mits internationally? Suppose the ﬁrm sells permits on the international
market. This implies that T>t . This is the same as a tightening of domes-
tic policy. Hence, the eﬀect is to reduce production. For a buying ﬁrm the11
reverse is true; T<tand production will be increased.
With permit trading, we can analyze the eﬀect of a shift from no trading
to trading on proﬁts of the ﬁrm by diﬀerentiating equation (1) with respect
to t.
∂Π
∂t
= Ptq + qt(P − Cq) − Et(t + CE) − (E − ¯ E)( 7 )
Since with permit trading, P = Cq and −CE = t, it follows that the second
and third term on the LHS of equation (7) are zero. Hence, we have
∂Π
∂t
= Ptq − (E − ¯ E)( 8 )
Suppose that the country initially implemented domestic permit trading and
ﬁrst afterwards allows international trade in permits. Furthermore, assume
that domestic trade in emissions was only allowed within the industry1.F i r s t
we will analyze the case where the ﬁrm becomes a seller of permits, i.e.
T>t . In that case, the ﬁrm will reduce its emissions. The result is a rise
in production costs and thereby a reduction in production. Since this is the
same for all domestic ﬁrms in this industry total production will fall and the
price of the product will rise. The reduction in emissions will be sold on
t h em a r k e ta tt h ep r i c eT.I n t h i s c a s e w e h a v e Pt > 0a n d( E − ¯ E) < 0
and equation (8) becomes positive. Hence, when the ﬁrm becomes a seller
of permits, its proﬁts will rise. When T<t , the ﬁrm becomes a buyer of
emission quotas. Now, the ﬁrst term in (8) gives a reduction in proﬁts, while
the second term points to an increase in proﬁts. Firms have lower abatement
costs now that they can buy quotas abroad, but this lowers production costs
and leads to an increase in production. World production increases and the
price of the product decreases, so that ﬁrm proﬁts decrease. Whether ﬁrm
proﬁts increase or decrease depends on how large the gains from emissions
trading are relative to the decrease in proﬁts from the lower world price of
the good.
We now turn to the case where the industry is regulated through credit
trading. The eﬀect of a shift to international emissions trading on the proﬁts
of the industry is ca be found by diﬀerentiating equation (3) with respect to
t
∂Π
∂t
= Ptq + qt(P − Cq + t¯ e) − Et(CE + t) − (E − ¯ eq)+tq¯ et (9)
Using the ﬁrst order conditions, we can see that the second and third term
on the RHS of equation (9) vanish. Hence, we have
∂Π
∂T
= PTq − (E − ¯ eq)+Tq¯ eT (10)
1This implies that with domestic trading E = ¯ E.12
The ﬁrst term on the RHS gives the eﬀect of the change in price of the
product on revenue. The second term is the change in proﬁt due to a sale or
purchase of credits. The third term on the RHS reﬂects the change in proﬁts
because of a change in the relative standard. We have to elaborate a bit on
the third term. When the world credit price is diﬀerent from the domestic
credit price, ﬁrms will start trading credits. This however has an impact
on the marginal costs of production, and thereby on the level of production.
If T>t , marginal production costs will increase and production will be
lower. Conversely, when T<t , production will be increased. This will have
an impact on the relative standard though, since the government sets the
standard by dividing the limit on total emissions by aggregate production.
Hence, when production is decreased, ¯ e is increased, i.e., policy becomes less
strict. This implies that ¯ eT > 0, i.e., when the credit price rises, production
decreases and the relative standard will be increased.
Suppose that T>tand the ﬁrms in the industry become exporters of
emission credits and production will decrease. In that case, the ﬁrst term
in (10) become positive, while the second term becomes negative. This is
exactly the same as with permit trading. Furthermore, the government will
increase the relative standard because of the decrease in production, so that
the third term becomes positive. The result is that (10) is positive and proﬁts
increase for the ﬁrm when it becomes a seller of credits.
When instead T<t , the ﬁrms will buy emission quotas on the world
market. The ﬁrst term and third term in (10) are still positive, while the
second term now becomes positive. The ﬁrm gains from emissions trading
through lower costs of abatement. However, proﬁts decrease because of a
lower world price of the good and a tighter relative standard. It depends on
how large the gain from emissions trading is whether ﬁrms will be better of
from a shift to international emissions trading.
The result for credit trading is thus basically the same as for permit
trading. With credit trading, there is however an additional eﬀect because
changes in production lead to a change in the relative standard that is set.
For a seller of permits, this means an additional gain as the standard is made
less strict, while for a buyer, it is an additional loss.
Having analyzed the change in ﬁrm proﬁts resulting from a shift to in-
ternational emissions trading, we now turn to the eﬀect on total country
welfare. With international emissions trading, the objective function of the
government becomes
W = µh
 y
o P(y)dy − P(y)µhy + P(y)nhqh − nhC(qh,E h)
−nhT

Eh − ¯ Eh
 (11)13
Diﬀerentiating with respect to qh yields
nh (P − Cq)+P
 ∂y
∂qh
(nhqh − µhy) = 0 (12)
Hence, the optimization problem of the government is essentially the same
as when there is no international emissions trading. There are however some
important diﬀerences. With international emissions trading, the government
cannot set the level of emissions, i.e. it cannot set T, the price of permits,
through the emission ceiling it sets.
The shift from national emissions trading to international emissions trad-
ing can be viewed as a change in the price of emissions quotas. To ﬁnd out
whether allowing international emissions trading for individual ﬁrms will lead
to a higher welfare, diﬀerentiate equation (11) with respect to the price of
permits, t. This is not a completely correct way of analyzing this since the
change in emission quota price is discrete, but one could imagine that the
world price of emission quotas is only marginally diﬀerent from the domestic
price. After rearranging, diﬀerentiation of (11) gives
∂W
∂t
= nh
dq
dt
(P − Cqh)+P
∂y
∂q
dq
dt
(nhqh − µhy) − nh

Eh − ¯ Eh

(13)
A rise in the price of emission quotas is equivalent to a stricter emission
standard, implying dqh/dt < 0. As noted before, 0 <
∂y
∂q < 1 because of the
reaction to a change in domestic output by foreign producers. The ﬁrst term
on the RHS of (13) gives the diﬀerence between the price and the marginal
production costs times the change in total output. The second term gives
the trade balance in the product times the change in the product price due
to a change in output. The third term gives revenue from emissions trading.
In the following, we will analyze whether a change to international emissions
trading leads to higher welfare for each of the two instruments separately.
After that, the optimal policy for the country in the four possible cases is
discussed.
Permit Trading. With permit trading, P = Cqh and equation (13) dimin-
ishes to
∂W
∂t
= P
∂y
∂q
dq
dt
(nhqh − µhy) − nh

Eh − ¯ Eh

(14)
Basically, there are four possible cases depending on the balance of trade in
the product and on the world price of permits. An overview of these four
cases is given in Table 1. In the ﬁrst case, the country is an exporter of
the good and the world price of permits is higher than the domestic price.14
In this case, the country will export permits, hence (Eh − ¯ Eh) < 0. The
higher permit price will give a decrease in production and this will raise the
price of the product. The overall eﬀect is that equation (14) will be positive.
Hence, the shift to international emissions trading leads to a welfare gain
in this case. It has to be noted though that this only holds as long as the
country remains a net exporter of the good. If production is decreased so
much because of the rise in the permit price that the country becomes a net
importer, welfare may decrease.
In the second case, the country also exports the good, but the world price
of permits is lower than the domestic price. This means that production will
be increased and therefore the price of the product decreases. Furthermore,
because of the lower world price, the country imports emission quotas. In
this case, the ﬁrst term in (14) is positive, but the second term becomes
positive. Welfare decreases because the price of the product decreases, while
an increase is needed, but welfare increases because of the trade in emissions.
If the gains from emissions trading are low, the country may experience a
loss in welfare when it shifts to international emissions trading. However, the
gain from emissions trading can be so big as to outweigh the negative eﬀect
from a decrease in the product price.
The third case consist of the country being an importer of the good and
the world price of permits being higher than the domestic price. Also here,
the sign of equation (14) becomes ambiguous. The result of the higher world
price of permits is a reduction in production. However, an increase in produc-
tion is wanted. On the other hand, the country exports permits, which leads
to higher welfare. This is indicated by the negative sign of the second term.
It now depends on the size of the two eﬀects whether welfare is increased as
a result of allowing international emissions trading.
In the fourth case, the country is an importer of the good and T<t .T h e
country becomes an importer of emission quotas, which leads to an increase
in production and a decrease in the price of the good. Both terms in (14)
point in the direction of an increase in welfare. However, the increase in
production may be so large that the country becomes an exporter of the
good. In that case, welfare may decrease. However, since the country always
gains directly from emissions trading, the production eﬀect needs to be very
large indeed for the change in welfare to be negative.
Credit Trading. With credit trading P<C qh, and equation (13) holds
unchanged. Also with credit trading, there are four possible cases, depending
on the sign of (nhqh − µhy) ,a n do nw h e t h e rT is larger or smaller than t.
For an overview of the cases, see Table 2.
In the ﬁrst case, the country is an exporter of the good and the world price15
Table 1: Eﬀect of a shift from national to international permit trading
(nhqh − µhy) T qh P (Eh − ¯ Eh) Welfare
+ >t ↓↑ – Increase
+ <t ↑↓ + Decrease (amb.)
– >t ↓↑ – Decrease (amb.)
– <t ↑↓ + Increase
of permits is higher than the domestic price. This means that production
will decrease, the price of the product will increase, and the country exports
permits. The result is that equation (13) becomes positive, which indicates
an increase in welfare. The country makes a proﬁt from emissions trading
and product price increases, leading to higher ﬁrm proﬁts. At the same time,
the production distortion, given by the term P −Cqh becomes less important
because qh decreases.
In the second case, the country is still an exporter of the good, but now
the world price of permits is lower than the domestic price. In this case,
production will increase, the product price will fall and the country imports
permits. The country still gains from emissions trading because it now faces
lower marginal abatement costs. However, the country would like to reduce
output to increase the price of the good, but the lower permit price leads to
an increase in production. This lowers proﬁts for the ﬁrms and gives a larger
production distortion. Whether the country gains or looses from the shift to
international emissions trading depends on the sizes of the three eﬀects. If
the direct gain from emissions trading is low, welfare may decrease because
of the shift.
In the third case, the country is an importer of the good and the world
price of emission quotas is higher than the domestic price. The country now
sells credits, and lowers production, leading to an increase in the world price
of the good. In this case, however, the country would prefer an increase in
production to increase the consumers’ surplus. The ﬁrst and third term in
(13) still point to an increase in welfare though; the country gains from emis-
sions trading and the production distortion becomes less important through
the reduction in production. Also here the total eﬀect of a shift to interna-
tional emissions trading is ambiguous. If the direct gains from trading are
large enough to outweigh the detrimental eﬀect on the consumers’ surplus,
the country will gain from the shift. The reverse is possible too though.
Also in the fourth case the country imports the good, but now the world
price of emission quotas is lower than the domestic price. In this case, pro-
duction rises and the product price falls, this is exactly what the country16
Table 2: Eﬀect of a shift from national to international credit trading
(nhqh − µhy) T qh P (Eh − ¯ Eh) Welfare
+ >t ↓↑ – Increase
+ <t ↑↓ + Decrease (amb.)
– >t ↓↑ – Decrease (amb.)
– <t ↑↓ + Increase
wants. At the same time, the country gains from the lower costs of abate-
ment. The only ambiguity in equation (13) is that the production distortion
is increased because of the increase in production. This eﬀect is likely to be
small though so that, it is likely that the country will want to implement
international credit trading in this case. The only problem could be that the
world price of emission quotas is so low that production rises enough to make
the country only a small importer or even an exporter of the good. In those
cases, the country is better of with domestic credit trading.
Optimal Policy. We can now discuss the policy results for all possible cases.
The optimal policies in all cases are summarized in Table 3. A comparison
of tables 1 and 2 shows that whichever instrument the government chooses,
it always gains or looses in the same situations from a shift to international
emissions trading. The country gains from the shift when it exports the good
and it becomes a seller of emission quotas and it gains when it imports the
good and becomes a buyer of emission quotas. In the other cases, welfare
may decrease as a result from the shift, depending on how much the direct
gain from emissions trading is. This part then shows whether the country
should allow international emissions trading or not. Which of the two trading
schemes should be chosen can be inferred from equations (6) and (12).
When the country runs a trade surplus and the world price of emission
quotas is higher than the domestic price, the country should allow interna-
tional permit trading, which implies that it uses domestic permit trading
too. The reason for this is that in this case the country wants to reduce
production. This is done best by international permit trading, because in
this case this lowers production in comparison with domestic permit trading,
which is the optimal instrument when international trading is not an option.
Only when the shift to international permit trading leads to a large decrease
in production so that the country achieves autarky in the good, or becomes
an importer might the country not allow international trade in permits. This
depends partly on the gain from international emissions trading. If this gain
is large enough, the country should still engage in trading, even though it17
Table 3: Policy
(nhqh − µhy) T Policy
+ >t International permit trading
+ <t Domestic permit trading
– >t Domestic credit trading
– <t International credit trading
becomes an importer of the good.
When the country runs a trade surplus and the world price of permits is
lower than the domestic price, the best policy for the government is to use
domestic permit trading and not to allow international permit trading. The
reason is that international permit trading leads to an increase in production,
while a decrease is wanted. A provision has to be made for the situation where
proﬁts from international emissions trading are large. In that case, these
proﬁts may compensate the negative eﬀect of an increase in production.
In the third case, the country is an importer of the good and the world
price of permits is higher than the domestic price. As we have seen above,
when international emissions trading is not possible the country should prefer
domestic credit trading when it is an importer, unless it only imports a little.
When international trading is possible, the higher world price of credits leads
to a decrease in production with permit trading and with credit trading. In
this case, the country prefers to use domestic credit trading and will not
allow international emissions trading as long as the gain from international
emissions trading is small.
In the fourth and ﬁnal case, the country is an importer of the good and
the world price of permits is lower than the domestic price. When the trade
deﬁcit is large, the country will want to implement international credit trad-
ing since this increases production most. If the trade deﬁcit is small, the
country will prefer to use international permit trading or domestic credit
trading because these also increases production, but not as much as interna-
tional credit trading.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, a model on strategic choice of emissions trading scheme was
presented. Countries can either choose to implement permit trading, which
is based on a cap on emissions per ﬁrm, or credit trading, which is based
on relative standards per unit of output. The two scheme have a diﬀerent18
impact on the regulated industry, with credit trading leading to a higher
output level and higher marginal abatement costs.
The main conclusions are that countries do have an incentive to choose
their emissions trading scheme strategically and that in some cases, countries
are better of when they do not allow international emissions trading. The
outcome depends on whether the country is an importer of the good, whether
the world price for emission quotas is lower or higher than the domestic price
and on how large the gain from international emissions trading is.
In general, when a country exports the good it wants to reduce output to
increase the world price of the good and thereby increase ﬁrm proﬁts. The
best choice of instrument in this case is permit trading since it leads to the
lowest production level. When the country imports the good, however, it
wants to increase production to increase the domestic consumers’ surplus.
Since credit trading leads to the highest output level, the country will prefer
this instrument.
Whether or not a country wants to allow international emissions trading
for its ﬁrms depends mainly on two things: the world price of emission quotas
relative to the domestic price and the size of the gain from emissions trading.
When the country becomes a seller of emission quotas, it will reduce output.
However, when it imports the good, the country will want to increase pro-
duction. Then it may be better not to allow international emissions trading.
Only when the direct gain from emissions trading is large enough will the
country still proﬁt from international emissions trading. A similar reasoning
holds for the case where the country becomes a buyer of emission quotas.
Several issues have not been dealt with in this paper, which could have an
impact on the outcome. The model presented only analyzes the behavior of
one country. An interesting extension would consist of modelling the choice of
international emissions trading scheme in a two-country model to determine
the Nash equilibrium choices. Furthermore, throughout the model I have
assumed that the countries have no inﬂuence on the world emission quota
price. Although this will be a realistic assumption for many countries and
many industries, it may be relevant to relax this assumption.
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